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I Introduction
In this paper I will discuss some of the broad philosophical issues that apply to the field of Machine Ethics (ME). ME is often seen primarily as a practical research area involving the modelling and implementation of artificial moral agents. However this shades into a broader, more theoretical inquiry into the nature of ethical agency, moral value, etc., as seen from an AI or informationtheoretical point of view and the extent to which autonomous AI agents can have moral status of different kinds.
As a practical research focus, ME has various kinds of objectives. Some are technically quite welldefined and close-to-market -such as the development of ethically responsive robot care assistants, or of automated advisers for clinicians on medical ethics issues. Other Practical ME aims are more long-term, such as the design of a general purpose ethical reasoner/advisor -or perhaps even of a 'genuine' moral agent with a status equal (or as equal as possible) to human moral agents.
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The broader design issues of 'practical' ME shade into philosophical issues, including the question of what it means to be a 'genuine moral agent' -as opposed merely to one which 'behaves as if' it were being moral. What 'genuine moral agent' means in this context is itself an important issue for discussion. There are many other conceptual questions to be addressed here, and clearly the more philosophical inquiries within ME overlap considerably with discussion in mainstream moral philosophy. 'Philosophical' ME also incorporates even more speculative issues -including whether the arrival of ever more intelligent, autonomous agents, as may be anticipated in future developments in AI, could lead us to have to recast ethical thinking as such, perhaps so that it is less exclusively human-oriented, and better accommodates a world where such intelligent agents exist in large numbers, interacting with humans and with each other, and possibly dominating or even replacing humanity.
In what is discussed here, I will consider all of these strands of ME -close-focused practical ME research, longer range practical ME goals, and various more speculative questions, some of which reach into the foundations of Ethics itself. Much of the emphasis will be at the more speculative end: in particular I wish to explore various perspectives on the idea of 'widening the circle of moral participation', as it might be called, emerges from ME, taken in its broadest sense. I will compare how this idea of widening the ethical circle may work itself out within ME as compared with other, rather different, but equally challenging ethical approaches, in particular those inspired by animal rights and by environmental thinking. Also, artificial agents are technological agents, so we will find ourselves raising questions concerning the ethical significance of technology, and concerning the relation between technology and the 'natural' world. This invites us to contrast certain ethical implications of ME with views that radically challenge values inherent in technology.
A major focus in the following discussion will thus be the idea of the 'more-than-human' -a term inspired by the ecological philosopher David Abram (1996) . I believe that it is instructive to develop a dialogue between approaches to ethics inspired by ME (and by informatics more generally) and approaches inspired by biological and environmental concerns. ME, in its more radical and visionary form, develops a variety of conceptions of a 'more-than-human world' which strongly contrasts with ecological conceptions. However, as we will see, in some ways there are striking resonances between the two kinds of view. Also, I would claim, it is of importance to the practical ME researcher, and to researchers in AI in general, to explore the relationships between these different broad perspectives on ethics and the more-than-human world.
II Machine Ethics: Some Key Questions.
Artificial intelligence might be defined as the activity of designing machines that do things which, when done by humans are criterial of the possession of intelligence in those human agents. Similarly artificial (or machine) ethics could be defined as designing machines that do things which, when done by humans, are criterial of the possession of 'ethical status' in those humans. (Note that the notion of ethical status can apply to 'bad' as well as 'good' acts: a robot murderer, like a robot saint, will have a distinctive ethical status.)
What kinds of entities have 'ethical status'? In general, most people would not regard an inanimate object as having genuine moral status. Even though you can 'blame' a faulty electrical consumer unit for a house fire, this is more a causal accounting than a moral one: it would seem that you can't treat it as morally culpable in the way you can a negligent electrician or an arsonist. There is perhaps a commonly held presumption that current AI systems are more like household electrical consumer units in this respect, but many would question that presumption, at least in certain possible future scenarios.
As can be seen, the notion of 'having ethical status' is difficult to pin down, but it can be seen to involve two separate but associated aspects, which could be called ethical productivity and ethical receptivity. Saints and murderers -as well as those who do their duty by filing their tax returns honestly and on time -are ethical producers; while those who stand to benefit from or to be harmed by the acts of others are ethical recipients (or 'consumers'). 2 If I believe an artificial agent ought to be solicitous of my interest then I am viewing that agent as a moral producer. If, on the other hand, I believe that I ought to be solicitous of the artificial agent's interest then I am viewing it as a potential moral receiver. [See figure 1.] The main emphasis of practical ME has been on moral productivity rather than receptivity -not least because it seems easier to specify what you might need to do to design a morally productive artificial agent than it is to say what is involved in an 22 See Torrance (2008 Torrance ( , 2009 . It should be pointed out that these are roles which an individual may play, and that clearly a single person can occupy both roles at the same time -for instance if a earthquake victim (who is a moral recipient in that she is, or ought to be, the object of others' moral concern) also performs heroic acts in saving other victims' life (and thus, as someone whose behaviour is to be morally commended, occupies in this respect the role of moral producer). Also the two kinds of role may partially overlap, as they perhaps do in the concept of 'respect': if I respect you for your compassion and concern for justice (moral producer) I may see you as therefore deserving of particular consideration (moral recipient) -but there is no space to go into that in more detail here.
artificial agent being a moral receiver or consumer. Notions of artificial moral receptivity are perhaps at the more speculative end of the ME spectrum; nevertheless, for various reasons, they may need to be addressed.
---- Fig. 1 around here. -----At a very high level of generality, and taking into account the distinction just discussed between ethical productivity and receptivity, two related questions suggest themselves concerning ME in its various forms:
1. The Possibility of Machine Ethics: How far is it feasible to develop artificial agents that satisfy either of the two key ethical properties outlined, i.e.
1a which are 'ethically responsible' in some way -that can act in ways that conform to the kinds of norms that we ethically require of the behaviour of human agents (ethical productivity)? Or 1b which have 'ethical interests' or 'ethical goods' of their own -that is, that have properties that qualify them as beings towards which humans have ethical duties (ethical receptivity)?
The Ethics of Machine Ethics:
What is the ethical significance of ME as a general project; and more specifically, is it ethically appropriate to develop artificial agents of either of the previous two kinds? That is, 2a that are genuine, autonomous ethical producers (or at least that simulate or appear to be such agents)? Or 2b that are ethical recipients -that have genuine moral claims or rights (or at least that simulate or appear to be such beings)?
In order to discuss these questions, and the relations between them, I propose to distinguish four broad perspectives. These are, in the first instance, four approaches to ethics in general, and also, more widely, four approaches to the world and to nature. The four approaches are given the labels Anthropocentrism, Infocentrism, Biocentrism and Ecocentrism.
3 By extension these four perspectives can be taken also to offer distinctive positions on ME, and in particular to the above questions, and on some broader issues, which will be identified during the course of the discussion. The approaches may be seen to be partially overlapping, and also, as a whole, far from exhaustive. A comparison of these four perspectives will, I hope, define a space of discussion that it will be rewarding to explore for those involved in ME, or more widely in artificial agent research.
Each of these perspectives takes up a distinctive position on the question of the composition of the 'moral constituency' -that is, the question of just which kinds of beings in the world count as either moral producers or as moral recipients. Maybe it is better to think of these four labels as hooks on which to hang various clusters of views that tend to associate together.
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III Four perspectives
Here is an initial sketch of each approach:
 Anthropocentrism. This approach represents the baseline from which all the major variations in the other views take their departure. As its name implies, this view defines ethics (conventionally enough) as centred around human needs and interests: all other parts of the animate and inanimate world are seen as having little or no inherent value, other than in relation to human goals. It goes without saying that various versions of this approach have occupied a dominant position in Western philosophy for some time. There are many varieties of anthropocentrism and there is no requirement for us to go into detail on them here. In relation to the objectives of ME, and those of AI more broadly, the anthropocentric view sees machines, however intelligent or 'person-like' they may be, as being nothing other instruments for human use. The project of ME is thus interpreted, on this approach, as being essentially a kind of safety systems engineering, or an extension of the latter. Perhaps many of those engaged in practical, narrowly-focused, ME research would agree with this position. As we will see, biocentric and ecocentric approaches can also be defined in terms of their dissent from, or expansion of, human ethical concerns.
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 Infocentrism. This approach is based on a certain view of the nature of mind or intelligence, which in turn suggests a rather more adventurous view of ethics in general, and of ME in particular. The informational view of mind, which has been extensively discussed and elaborated within AI and Cognitive Science circles over many decades, affirms that key aspects of mind and intelligence can be defined and replicated as computational systems. Within this perspective ethics may best be seen as having a cognitive or informational core 6 : moreover the informational/rational aspects of ethics can, it will be said, be extended to AI systems, so that we can (at least in principle) produce artificial agents that are not merely operationally autonomous but have characteristics of being ethically autonomous as well.
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On the infocentric view, then, machines with ethical properties would not be merely safer mechanisms, but would (or at least might) be ethical agents in their own right. Some proponents of the infocentric view will be sensitive to the complaint that ethical thinking and action isn't just cognitive and that emotion, teleology, consciousness, empathy, etc., play important roles in moral thinking and experience. They may go on, however, to claim that such phenomena can also be defined in informational terms, and can be modelled in artificial cognitive systems. Even though doing that may be hard in practice, they would say, it should be possible in principle for artificial computational agents to exemplify emotion, consciousness, etc. It would follow that such artificial agents could be (again, in principle at least) not just morally active or productive, but also morally receptive beings -that is, beings which may have their own ethical demands and rights.
Infocentrism, as here understood, has a strong technocentric bias -indeed it might instead have been named 'technocentrism' (except that the view we are considering pivots crucially around information-based technologies). In its more adventurous forms infocentrism sees possible future AI agents as forming a new class of intelligent being alongside humans, whose capacities and interests are to be taken, ethically, as seriously as those of humans.
 Biocentrism. On this approach being a living, sentient, creature, with natural purposes and interests, is at the core of what it is to have a mind, to be a rational intelligent agent. By extension, ethical status is also believed to be necessarily rooted in core biological properties. Often ethics, on this approach, is seen as having important affective, and motivational elements. Biocentrists may well claim that such elements cannot be adequately captured within an informational model. These affective elements may further be seen as deriving from a deep prehuman ancestry. Adherents of this approach may be strongly opposed to the infocentric approach. But they will also express opposition to an anthropocentric view of ethics. They are likely to stress the ways in which affectivity and sentience in non-human animals qualify such creatures to be centres of ethical concern or as holders of moral rights, even though non-human animals largely lack rational powers (see Singer 1977 , Regan 1983 , for classic attacks on anthropocentric approaches to the treatment of animals). Biocentrism also tends towards an rationalists such as Kant); or with the more modern view that information (in some sense of the term based on computer science, information-theory or similar fields) is a key determinant of moral value. (Luciano Floridi defends a view of the latter sort -see, for example , Floridi 2008a , Floridi , 2008b Certainly the second of these two variants, and possibly also the first, more ancient, one may be seen as being embraced by the infocentric approach.
7 Notions of autonomy are notoriously difficult to define. As a rough and ready way of marking the difference between operational and ethical autonomy, a vehicle that can navigate without a human driver either on board or in tele-control may be considered as operationally autonomous, without being ethically autonomous. Perhaps, if its object-avoidance system enables it to reliably avoid colliding with human pedestrians in the road, cyclists, etc., that might go some way to qualifying it for the latter description.
ethical position characterized by E.O. Wilson (1884 Wilson ( , 1994 as 'biophilia' -a view that claims that humans have an innate bond with other biological species, and that, in virtue of this, natural biological processes should have an ethical privileging in our system of values, as compared with the technological outputs of modern industrial civilization, and other non-living objects in our environment. Infocentrists, by contrast, will tend towards the converse ethical attitude of 'technophilia'.
 Ecocentrism. Infocentrism could be seen as one kind of natural direction in which anthropocentrism might develop, given the existence of tools for artificially replicating distinctively human capacities -particularly cognitive ones. Similarly, ecocentrism could be seen as a natural progression from biocentrism. Ethics, on this approach, is seen as applying primarily to entire ecosystems (or the biosphere, the Gaia (Lovelock 1979 (Lovelock , 2006 ), and to individual organisms only as they exist within the context of such ecosystems. Like biocentrism, ecocentrists oppose the anthropocentric stress on the human sphere. However ecocentrismat least in its more radical forms -also opposes the biocentrist's stress on the moral status of individual creatures, stressing instead claims of whole ecosystems to being given ethical consideration (at least as centres of moral concern, if not of moral agency).
Further, ecocentrist literature is strongly coloured by a sense of a growing crisis in industrial civilization -particularly in its more militant or apocalyptic forms -together with a belief in the need to reject the values of technological, market-based society in favour of social values that are tuned to the natural processes of the ecosphere and to the perceived threats to those processes. Thus many supporters of ecocentrism will express a deep antipathy to the technological bias that is implied by the infocentric approach.
Despite the deep oppositions that clearly exist between the different positions just outlined, biocentrism, ecocentrism and infocentrism nevertheless appear to share at least one broad feature. Each stresses an aspiration to transcend the domain of the merely human in ethical terms. The extra-human or post-human emphases are rather different in the three cases: a technological-AI based emphasis (infocentrism); an extension of respect from the human species to a wide variety (or the totality) of other living species (biocentrism); and an emphasis on the total natural environment, including its inanimate aspects (ecocentrism). Nevertheless it is worthwhile to compare the posthuman elements that exist within the more radical expressions of all these positions (especially infocentrism and ecocentrism), to see in more detail the points of contrast and also of possible commonality within the various approaches. This is something that we will address later on in the paper.
I'll now address how adherents of these various approaches may respond to the questions that I outlined earlier. To recall, these were questions as to the feasibility and the ethical desirability of ME, as well as to some broader issues that will come up in the course of the discussion.
IV Anthropocentrism
Adherents of this approach are most likely to view the project of ME as a specific domain of intelligent systems engineering, rather than the project of developing machines as ethical agents in their own right. So the anthropocentrist's most likely response to question 1a, on the possibility of developing ethically responsible artificial agents, is that there is no reason why ethical constraints should not be built into the control systems of such agents, but that such agents should not be considered as having their own autonomous moral responsibilities -they would simply be instruments for the fulfilment of human purposes. On question 1b, on the possibility of ethical receptivity in artificial agents, the anthropocentrist would probably give a sceptical response: it would typically be considered difficult to envisage artificial mechanisms as having the kind of properties -consciousness, inherent teleology, etc. -that would qualify them for ethical consideration as beings with their own moral interests or goods.
On question 2 -the ethics of pursuing machine ethics as a project -the anthropocentrist would be likely to stress the importance of not misrepresenting such a project as having pretensions to loftier goals than it is entitled (on this view) to claim for itself. ME could at most be a subdomain of the broader field of technological ethics, it would be said. On question 2a, concerning the desirability of artificial moral 'producers', an anthropocentrist might claim that the only moral responsibilities and obligations that could be in play would be those of the human users of AI agents. So it would be important not to pretend that artificial agents could have any autonomous moral status: this could lead, when things go wrong, to humans illegitimately shifting the blame to artificial agents. Similarly, on 2b, on the ethical desirability of artificial ethical 'recipients', it could be argued, conversely, that attributing moral receptivity where it does not exist could lead to unjust diversion of resources from those genuinely in need (namely humans). For example: if there is a road accident involving numbers of both human and robot casualties, spreading scarce time and manpower to give assistance to the latter would have to be considered morally wrong, if, as anthropocentrists might argue, the robot 'victims' of the accident should really be considered as nothing but nonconscious machinery with no genuine moral claims.
V Infocentrism
It is to be supposed that many current researchers in the ME community fit into the infocentric category (although others may see themselves as more aligned with anthropocentrism, as described earlier). Adherents of the infocentric approach will tend to see the creation of robots and other artificial beings which approximate to at least some degree to autonomous ethical actors (question 1a) as a realizable goal, and indeed as a vital one given, the threat of a spread of functionally autonomous, but morally non-controlled, AI agents. There is, perhaps, a certain degree of naivety in this hope -the idea that adding the right kinds of ethical intelligence to the mix of cognitive capacities in an artificial autonomous agent will give an assurance of moral safety, as if it were like adding the right amount of sherry to a trifle. In any case how human-like must the added morality be? There will be disagreement on how far any artificial moral agency could approach the full richness of human ethical agency. It depends on the view of moral agency that is adopted. The lack of consensus on this question among conventional moral philosophers, has emboldened many ME researchers to claim that their own research may produce more clarity than has been achieved hitherto by mere armchair philosophizing. (As with other areas where AI researchers have offered computational solutions to long-standing philosophical questions, conventional philosophers might be found to be somewhat underwhelming in their gratitude.)
There is clearly room for much nuance within the broad sweep of infocentric views. Some adherents may see information-processing as lying at the core of what it is to be an ethical agent, human or otherwise, and may therefore see no limits, in principle (if not in practice) to the degree to which an artificial agent could approach or even surpass human skills in moral thought and behaviour (I am assuming here that it is appropriate to talk of moral agency as a "skill"). Others may take moral agency to involve important elements that are less amenable to informational or computational modelling, and may therefore take there to be definite limits to how far a computational agent could go towards being a genuine moral agent. 9 Nevertheless even while recognizing such limits, it may still be possible to envisage a healthy and productive industry in the development of computational ethical systems and agents, which will make the deployment of autonomous artificial agents around the world more responsible and humanity-respecting.
The primary focus of the infocentric approach is, as we have seen, on ethical agency rather than receptivity: hence adherents of this approach may again comment on question 1b in different ways. Some would say that artificial beings could never be given the kind of moral respect that we give to conscious humans or indeed to some animals, since purely informationally-based systems could never, even in principle, possess consciousness, sentience or whatever other properties might be relevant to such moral respect. 10 Others might disagree with this last point, and claim that all mental properties, including consciousness, are informatic at root -so that in principle a conscious, rational robot (or indeed a whole population of such) could be created in due course. They couldbut perhaps needn't -further agree that such a sentient robot would have general moral claims upon us. 11 Yet another take on question 2 would be that having genuine moral claims on us need not require consciousness -at least not of the phenomenal, 'what-it-is-like' sort. This would considerably lower the criteria threshold for developing artificial beings with moral claims or rights.
On question 2, about the ethics of ME, adherents of the infocentric approach would be likely to think that such a project -at least of the first sort, developing moral agents or 'producers' (2a) -is morally acceptable, and maybe even imperative. As artificial agents develop more operational or functional autonomy it will be important to ensure that their freedom of choice is governed by the kinds of ethical norms that we apply to free human behaviour. This may be so, it could be argued, even if such agents could only ever be faint approximations to what we understand human moral agency to be. Adherents of the infocentric approach may say that, if properly designed, 'para-ethical' agents (Torrance, 2008 (Torrance, , 2009 ) may go a long way to introducing the kind of moral responsibility and responsiveness into autonomous agents that is desirable as such technology spreads. Thus, for example, in Moral Machines, Wallach and Allen write: "it doesn't really matter whether artificial systems are genuine moral agents" -implying that it's the results that are important. They go on: "The engineering objective remains the same: humans need advanced (ro)bots to act as much like moral agents as possible. All things considered, advanced automated systems that use moral criteria to rank different courses of action are preferable to ones that pay no attention to moral issues." (2008: 199) But should we then blame them if they choose wrongly? And should we allow the humans who designed the moral robots, or those who followed the robots' advice or acted on their example, to escape moral censure, if things go terribly wrong?
As for 2b, the ethics of developing artificial creatures which have genuine moral claims upon humans (and upon each other), this may be seen in a less positive light by the infocentric approach. Those who defend a strong view of the computational realizability of a wide range of mental phenomena, including consciousness 12 and affective states, rather than merely functional or cognitive states, may believe it to be eminently possible (again, in principle at least) to produce artificial beings that have the kinds of 'mental' processes that do make it natural, or even necessary, to consider them as having moral claims of their own. 13 It may be quite novel to produce 'conscious' robots in ones or twos, but technological innovations often spread like forest fires. The project of creating a vast new population of such beings with their own independent moral claims may well be considered to be highly dubious from an ethical point of view. (For instance, as with all autonomous manufactured agents, they would require various kinds of resources in order to function properly; but if genuinely conscious, they might well need to be considered as having moral rights to those resources. This may well bring them into competition with humans who have moral claims to those same 12 The field of Machine Consciousness in some ways mirrors that of ME. As in the latter, Machine
Consciousness includes the practical development of artificial models of aspects of consciousness, or even attempts to instantiate consciousness in robots, as well as broader philosophical discussions of the scope and limitations of such a research programme. For discussion of the relations between machine consciousness and ethics, with implications for machine ethics, see Torrance 2000 Torrance , 2007 resources.) Then there is also the issue of whether to restrict the design of artificial agents so that they don't give a false impression of having sentience, emotions, etc. when such features are in fact absent. Clearly problems to do with public misperception on such matters will raise their own moral tangles.
On the broader question of the ethical significance of the project of ME as such, there are, again, a number of possible responses from within the infocentric position. One striking view, heard from the more radical voices within the approach, sees developments in ME, but also in AI and in other related technologies, as presaging a change in ethical values at a global level -indeed perhaps such a transition as could be described as moving from an anthropocentric ethic to an infocentric ethic (Floridi 2008a, b) , where the latter is interpreted as suggesting that the overall fabric of ethics itself will need to be radically rethought, in order to accommodate the far reaches of computational or informatic developments. A view of this sort may be considered morally and conceptually objectionable on many accounts. One ground is the uncritical worship of technological 'progress' that appears to underlie such a perspective (see the discussion of the ecocentric approach below for more on this theme). Also, it rests heavily on the presumption that all the relevant aspects of human mentality are explicable in informational terms and can be transferred without remainder or degradation to post-biotic processing platforms. A very bright uebermind, which is unfeeling, aesthetically dull and creatively shackled does not seem to be a particularly worthy successor to human civilization.
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VI Biocentrism
This third approach provides a focus for some of the key objections that might be made by people outside the field when confronted with ME as conceived along the lines of the second approach, especially to the more strident variants of that approach. Biocentrism can be seen as a characteristic view of the nature of mind (and, by extension, of ethical value) which views mental properties as strongly rooted in elementary features of being a living, biological organism. One example of the biocentric approach is seen in the work of Maturana and Varela, for whom there is an intimate association between being a living system and being a cognizing system. On their influential autopoietic theory, to be a living creature is to be a self-maintaining system which enters into a sense-making -and thus both cognitive and evaluative -relationship with its environment. Thus, even for so elementary creature as a motile bacterium, searching out sugar, environmental features -in this case sugar concentrations -will have meaning for the organism, in terms of its lifepreserving and life-enhancing purposes. (Maturana and Varela 1980 , Thompson 2007 , Di Paolo 2005 ). An alternative version of the biocentric approach is to be found in the writings of Hans Jonas, for whom being alive is seen as a kind of 'inwardness' (Jonas, 1996 (Jonas, /2001 ).
The biocentric perspective on ME would claim that there are strong links between human ethical status -both of the active and of the receptive kinds -and our biological, organic makeup, and indeed from our rich evolutionary ancestry. The infocentric approach gives a high profile to the cognitive, specifically human aspects of mind, and thus paints a picture of morality that perhaps inevitably stresses ethical cognition or intelligence. By contrast, supporters of the biocentric approach will be prone to give a richer picture of moral agency: to be a moral agent is to be open to certain characteristic emotions or experiential and motivational states, as well as, no doubt, employing certain characteristic styles of cognition.
Because of the strong evolutionary links between human and other species, moral features of human life are seen by the biocentrist as being strongly continuous with earlier, pre-human, forms of relation and motivation (Midgley 1978 , Wright 1994 , De Waal 2006 ). Human moral agency, then, according to the Biocentric model, derives from a combination of deep ancestral biological features (such as the instinct to safeguard close kin-members and other conspecifics in situations of danger, and other precursors of the 'moral sentiments') and human-specific features such as the use of rationality and reflection in the course of ethical decision-making. AI research can perhaps make significant inroads into the second kind of properties, but will be much less potent with the first, it will be argued. So there will be strong in-principle limitations on how far one can stretch computational models of ethics, according to the biocentric view.
It is thus likely that the biocentric answer to question 1a, on the possibility of artificial agency, will be negative, for a variety of reasons. One reason concerns the nature of empathy and other emotions that seem to be at the heart of morality, and how they relate, within the human domain at least, to first-person experience. To be a moral agent, it will be argued, you must be able to react to, not just reason about, the predicament of others -that is, you must be able to reflect empathetically on what it would be like to be in such a predicament yourself. Such empathetic identification appears to 'up the ante' on what it takes to be a genuine moral agent, as it raises the question of how a nonbiological creature can understand (in a rich sense of 'understand' that is appropriate to this context) the needs of a biological creature. Thus morality is often said to be largely underpinned by a global 'golden-rule' norm of the form 'Do unto others only what you would wish to be done to yourself'. Operation of such a rule -or even understanding what it entails -perhaps involves having a first-person acquaintance with experiential-affective states such as pain, pleasure, relief, distress and so on.
Biocentrists can present a dilemma to ME researchers here. The latter need to choose whether or not to concede that first-person knowledge of such experiential-affective states are unable to be incorporated into a computational ME system. If they do agree that they cannot, then an important prerequisite for implementing ethical benevolence in a computational agent lies beyond the capabilities of ME research. If, on the other hand, ME researchers refuse to make such a concession, then they owe us a convincing explanation of how direct experience of pain, relief, etc. is feasible in a purely computational system. It is far from clear what form such an explanation might take. (Torrance 2007 ).
This is not just a theoretical issue. An important motivation for practical work in ME is the development of assistive agents that act as carers for aged or very young citizens. 15 If such an agent is to be properly ethically responsive to its charges, it will need to be able to detect accurately when they are distressed, or in physical pain (and also when they are just pretending, playing jokes, etc.) This is a skill that may also be required of ethically responsible robot soldiers when dealing with civilians who are unfortunate enough to find themselves in the theatre of war (Sparrow 2007) . Workers in AI and ME talk of the need to formalize the 'Theory of Mind' which, it is assumed, codifies the way humans detect the states of their conspecifics. But social cognition theories based on conceptions of Theory of Mind (or Simulation Theory) are seriously contested from many quarters (Gallagher 2001 (Gallagher , 2008 De Jaegher and Di Paolo 2007; De Jaegher 2008) . Not least among such challenges are counter-views that stress that understanding another's distress requires skills in social interactions that are partly biologically innate and partly dependent upon subtle developmental factors going back to early infancy and perhaps even pre-natal experiences (Trevarthen & Reddy 2007 ).
It will be seen that, for the biocentric approach, the style of response to question 1a will be strongly linked to how question 1b is to be answered (see Torrance 2008) . Biocentrism puts a relatively strong emphasis on moral receptivity, on morally relevant aspects of experience or feeling, whereas the infocentric approach seemingly finds it easier to focus on moral conduct or comportment than on morally relevant feelings. So the biocentrist's response to question 1b will probably be a strong negative: if moral receptivity depends upon morally relevant feelings or sentient states, and if computational agents can't actually undergo such feelings or sentient states, then an artificial agent can't be a moral recipient or consumer. 16 (However it should be noted that the reverse may not be true: it seems you can be fit to be a recipient of moral concern without necessarily being a properly constituted ethical actor. For instance many people concerned with animal welfare pinpoint ways in which animals suffer as a result of being reared and slaughtered for food-production, experimentation, etc. Such people would not normally think that non-human animals could be ethical 'agents' in the sense of having responsibilities, or of being the kinds of creatures whose conduct could be appraised ethically -certainly not, if ethical agency constitutively involves rationality or sequential reasoning. )
The biocentric approach will similarly look askance on the moral desirability of the ME enterprise (question 2). ME research would, on the biocentric view, succeed in creating, at best, very crude models of either active (2a) or receptive (2b) ethical roles in artificial agents. So it would be important for ME researchers not to mislead the public into thinking otherwise. By all means, biocentrists will agree, AI technology should be hedged by ethical controls as much as possibleartificial models of ethical thinking may even provide useful aids to human ethical thinking. But it will be important, they will say, to avoid treating artificial moral agents as being anything like genuine co-participants in the human moral enterprise.
VII Ecocentrism
Ecocentrism can be seen as a development from biocentrism, which, at least in certain important respects, would take even more marked exception to the ME enterprise, particularly in terms of its moral significance or desirability. Ecocentrism, as a broad ethical approach, takes its departure from certain internal debates within different strands of the ecological ethics movement. Ecological ethics takes for granted empirical claims concerning future trends in global population, climate change, depletion of natural resources, species extinctions, rises in sea level, and so on. These are claimed to be of paramount ethical concern because of the urgency and depth of the threats coming from these various directions: thus normative ethical systems which do not prioritize environmental crisis are criticized by all shades of ecocentric ethics.
However there are three importantly different kinds of motivation for environmental concern, and three different kinds of ethical view based on these different motivations (Sylvan & Bennett 1994 , Curry 2006 ). The first assumes that it is the threat to human interests which is the sole or major ethical driver for environmental concern (this is the 'light green' position -its ethical outlook is broadly consonant with the anthropocentric approach, as outlined above). The second approachwhich roughly corresponds to the biocentric approach as previously discussed -rejects what it sees as the human chauvinism of light green ethics, and instead voices concern on behalf of all sentient creatures, human or otherwise. (This is the 'mid-green' position.) It argues, in effect, for a principle of interspecies parity of suffering. This position broadly overlaps with biocentrism in its general orientation.
The third ('dark (or deep) green') approach takes an even more radical step, rejecting the 'sentientism' implicit in both the light and mid-green positions. This approach argues that it is entire ecosystems, and indeed the global ecosystem of the earth, which should be considered as the primary moral subject in our ethical thinking, and that, as such, all elements which participate in maintaining the harmonious functioning of that ecosystem can be considered as intrinsic targets of moral concern (Naess 1973 , Naess & Sessions 1984 . 17 The deep green position expresses the most distinctive viewpoint of what we are calling the ecocentric position. On the deep green view ethical concern includes within its scope all organic creatures, whether sentient or not, including flora; but also non-living parts of the landscape, such as mountains, rivers, oceans, and so on, all of which are part of the global milieu in which biological organisms survive and thrive. Further, because the causal determinants of the current ecological crisis are largely due to technological capitalism, deep green ecology also carries a strong ethical opposition to technological forms of civilization, and an aspiration to revert, to the degree to which this is possible, to more primitive forms of living.
At least in its more radical forms, the ecocentric approach stands in opposition to each of the other three approaches mentioned. First, deep or dark green ecocentrism rejects the human-oriented bias of the anthropocentric position, not just because of its unfair privileging of human concerns over the concerns of other beings whose moral status demand to be recognized, but also because, as they see it, nearly all the causes for current environmental threats can be attributed to human activity (also because environmental concerns, as voiced from an anthropocentric viewpoint, are considered to be based, not on a concern for the good of the environment as such, but rather on how the condition of the environment may affect future human interests.)
Second, strong ecocentrism rejects the infocentric position because it lays such direct, practical emphasis on the development of more and more sophisticated informatic technologies, and because of the role that such technologies play, as market products, in maintaining environmental threats; defenders of a strong ecocentric view will see infocentrism as little more than an elaboration of the anthropocentric approach. Third, strong ecocentrists question the biocentric position because, while the latter approach takes a wider view than merely human or technological concerns, it is still insufficiently comprehensive in its outlook. (However, the gaps between the biocentric and the ecocentric approaches are clearly less extreme than between the latter and the first two approaches.)
It will be evident that supporters of the ecocentric approach, in its stronger forms, will be likely to have as little positive as biocentrists do to say about the practical feasibility of ME research (question 1). Also they will have even less enthusiasm for its ethical desirability (question 2). Its main ethical concerns about the ME enterprise will be that it -and most current IT developments -are dependent in a variety of ways upon industrial, social and economic processes which themselves constitute deep physical threats to the environment. Perhaps ME researchers can adopt a more environmentally sensitive and self-reflective stance towards their own R&D practices, but maybe to do this properly would necessitate changes to those practices so radical as to strongly threaten their viability. For example it would require a searching environmental audit of such aspects as use of raw materials, the effects of mass-adoption of products, implications of electrical power consumption, and so on. There is clearly a vast range of critical questions that AI, robotics and other informatics researchers can ask themselves about the ecological footprint of their professional activities: only a relatively small number are doing so at present, and arguably that is a matter of some concern. No doubt ME researchers could also include ethical advice on ecological matters as a specific domain for ethical agent modelling.
However ecocentrism, in its more radical forms at least, may also imply a broad change in how ethics is conceived. Ecocentrists will stress global, earth-wide issues rather than more specific ones, and may demand a more proactive conception of ethically right action -not for nothing are their adherents often referred to as eco-warriors! So, if artificial ethical agents are to exist in any numbers, then they would, to satisfy the ecocentrist, need to be capable of playing a leading role in the daunting task of rapidly swinging world public opinion away from current obsessions with consumerism and towards the kind of 'green' values that, for ecocentrists, are the only values whose widespread adoption stand a chance of averting a global environmental cataclysm.
VIII Comparisons: The Machine and its Place in Ethics
We have looked at ME in terms of two broad issues: the possibility of developing artificial moral producers or recipients; and the ethical desirability of doing either or both of these in practice. The infocentric approach has, unsurprisingly, offered the most positive attitude towards those issues. Most current practical work in ME is focused on the task of creating artificial agents with moral expertise in various specific domains, although some practical attention is being given to the eventual development of what might be called 'general artificial ethical intelligence'. The problem of developing moral receptivity clearly raises even deeper issues (as we have seen, it can be argued that moral receptivity implies the possession of a sentient consciousness, though perhaps not everyone agrees with this). Many ME developers would question the need to address the issue of moral receptivity, in order to make progress on moral productivity. However, it is not clear that a simulation of a morally productive agent could be reliable or robust (let alone a 'genuine' moral agent) unless it also has a conception, based upon first-person experience, of being on the receiving end of the kinds of action which moral agents must consider in their moral deliberation.
But should we be creating artificial agents that can have genuine moral interests, that can experience the benefit or the harm of the kinds of situations that we, as (paradigmatic) moral recipients, evaluate as ones which are worth seeking or avoiding? Many would find this unacceptable, given the extent of deprivation, degradation and servitude that exists among existing moral recipients in the world. Then there is the question of moral competition between possible future artificial recipients and the natural ones who will be part of the same community. How does one assess the relative moral claims that those different classes of being will make upon members of the moral community? Also if, as we have been suggesting, the development of effective artificial moral productivity has an intimate dependence upon developing moral receptivity in such agents then these difficult issues may affect the validity of much more work in ME than is currently recognized by practitioners.
As we have seen, ME can be criticized from a number of different approaches. In our discussion we particularly singled out biocentrism and ecocentrism. But even from the point of view of anthropocentrism, ME is acceptable only if it is very limited in its objectives. Artificially intelligent agents will be seen, in the anthropocentric view, primarily as instruments to aid human endeavours -so for this approach the development of ethical controls on autonomous systems is just a particular application of the rules of (human-centred) engineering ethics that apply to any technological product, whether 'intelligent' or not. Any pretension to consider such 'autonomous systems' themselves as moral actors in their own right is indulging in fantasy, on this view.
Biocentric and ecocentric perspectives on ME have rather different critical concerns. As we have seen, these views are informed by an ethical respect for the natural, biological world, rather than the artificial, designed world. For ecocentrists in particular, nature as a whole can be seen as an ultimate ethical subject in its own right, a non-instrumental focus for moral concern. Thus a supporter of the ecocentric view, if presented with ME as a general project, may see it as simply an extension of anthropocentrism. The project of developing technological agents to simulate and amplify human powers -the 'fourth revolution', as Floridi refers to it (2008a), 18 might well be seen by ecocentrists as simply one of the more recent expressions of a human obsession with using technology and science to increase human mastery over nature.
Yet it is important to recognize a crucial point of commonality between infocentrism, biocentrism and ecocentrism: the way that each of these approaches develops a conception of the moral status that enlarges on the confines of the exclusively human. Each position develops a novel conception of the boundaries of the moral world that radically challenges traditional (anthropocentric) ethical schemes. And in view of the intellectual dominance of anthropocentric thinking in our culture, it is surely refreshing to see how each of these positions develops its respective challenge to this anthropic ethical supremacy.
Judged in this light, the disparities between these positions, particularly between infocentrism and ecocentrism -even in their more aggressive forms -are less marked than they may at first sight appear to be. Each of them proclaims a kind of extra-humanism, albeit of somewhat different forms. This is particularly true of the more radical forms of the infocentric and ecocentric positions. Both the latter reject the modernity of recent centuries, but from very different orientations: radical infocentrism is future-oriented, while radical ecocentrists tend to hark back to the deep history of the earth. Radical infocentrism sees humanity in terms of its potential to produce greater and greater innovation, and envisages intelligent agency in terms of future developments from current technologies; and that seems to imply a progressively wider rupture from the natural habitat. In a kind of mirror image of this, radical ecocentrism's view of humanity is often represented as reaching back to the life-world of primitive mankind, where natural surroundings are experienced as having an intimate relation to the self. David Abram's work (1996) provides a particularly impressive expression of this point of view.
Thus, in their different ways, both viewpoints urge a stretching of the moral constituency way beyond what conventional ethics will admit. Radical infocentrism sees a moral community filled out with artificial agents who may be affirmed as beings of moral standing, while radical ecocentrism seeks to widen the sphere of morally significant entities to include, not just animate species, but also plant life-forms, and inanimate features of land-and seascapes. This process of widening the moral community, of enacting a conception of the more-than-human, carries, on both sides, an impatience with conventional moral positions where the felt experience of benefit and of harm are taken as the key touchstones for determining moral obligation. 19 So each rejects the 'sentientism', with its emphasis on individual experienced benefit or suffering, that is at the heart of much conventional moral thinking (and, indeed, is at the core of biocentrism, which focuses on the potential suffering of non-human animals).
IX
Conclusion: A possible rapprochement?
So, in some important respects the infocentric and ecocentric views, in their more radical forms, have important similarities -at least in what they reject. Yet even in terms of positive values, one wonders whether it might be possible to apply critical pressure to each view, so as to enable some degree of convergence to take place. Consider, for example, the ecocentrist's rejection of technology, of artificiality, and the concomitant rejection of the artificial, the managed, in favour of the wild, the unkempt. One can point out in response that technology has its own kind of wildness, as many commentators have pointed out, not least many ecocentrists. Wide-scale technological processes have a dynamic in the way that they unfold that is to a considerable extent autonomous relative to human direction. Of course this self-feeding explosion of runaway technological growth, particularly over recent decades, has been a key driver of the current environmental crisis. Yet one wonders whether technology in itself is inimical to sustainable environmental development, as a too-simplistic ecocentric reading might insist. As James Lovelock reminds us in the opening passage to this paper, technology has a Jekyll/Hyde character: there is much that is beneficial as well as harmful in technology, and some of its developments (e.g. the bicycle?, the book?) seem to have offered comparatively little in the way of large-scale damaging consequences.
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Another issue concerns the boundary of the 'natural': where does 'natural' stop and 'artificial' begin? Are ecocentrists perhaps a little chauvinist themselves in rejecting certain values simply because they involve more technically advanced modes of practice rather than more primitive ones? Is not technological development itself a form of natural expression for homo sapiens? As Helmuth Plessner argued, surely it is part of our very nature as humans that we are artificial beings -we are, in an important sense, 'naturally artificial' (Ernste 2004, 443ff .) As humans, Plessner said, we live a kind of dual existence: we are partly centred in our bodies (as are other animals) but, because of our abilities to engage in reflection, representation of world and self, communication, artistic production, and so on, we are also 'eccentrically' located outside ourselves, and as such we are inescapably artificers, we are constantly on the make. So, if ecocentrism is to celebrate the diversity of natural systems and life-forms, then it also has to celebrate human naturalness as well -which means the production of technology, of culture, of knowledge that humanity has originated, even while we berate the devastating effects of such productions on our own and other species, and on the entire ecosystem.
Quite apart for the virtues that may be inherent in technology and other human products, there is the more pragmatic point that technologies are pretty well ineradicable. Given the existence of humanity and of human nature, it seems that machines will continue to have a crucial place in nature. We are no more capable of returning to a pre-technical existence than we are able to 20 David Abram suggests, on the contrary, that it is the advent of alphabetic, phonetic writing, and all the technologies that came in its train, that was a key factor in the loss of primitive experience of nature. Have the books (including Abram's) that followed alphabetization been of net benefit to mankind and/or to nature? eradicate selfishness and bigotry from human nature (although these latter qualities in humanity may succeed in taking us back to a more primitive form of technological existence. A more realistic way of proceeding would be to seek to develop technologies which are as progressive as possible from the point of view of environmental protection -to seek an artificial intelligence, and an ethics for our machines, which don't simply adopt a kind of non-interventionism in relation to global threats, but which, for example, positively move us in the direction of retreat from the abyss of environmental collapse towards which we are apparently currently hurtling. As the custodians of these machines, we must indeed adopt a greater responsiveness to those parts of the world which are not humanly-fashioned, or only minimally so, and that suffer from the excessive presence of mechanism in nature. And just possibly, intelligent agent technologies may be able to play a key role in that reversal, in ways which we are only beginning to have a glimmer of but which, if the AI community were to mobilize itself, could come to be articulated rapidly and effectively. And this, perhaps, also provides the best direction for research in Machine Ethics to take.
It may be a hard road to travel, particularly in view of the strident voices in the AI community, especially among the 'singularitarians', whose infocentrism (or better, infomania) leads them to celebrate an impending eclipse of humanity by a technology that has accelerated to the point where its processes of recursive self-enhancement are no longer remotely understandable by even the most technically savvy humans. Some predict this 'singularity' event with forboding (Joy 2000) , but many others do so with apparent glee (Kurzweil 2005 , Goertzel 2006 ) ; some even saying that the world will be a 'better place' for the eclipse of humanity that may result (Dietrich 2007) . The singularity literature perhaps does a service by highlighting the ways in which AI developments could produce new degrees of intelligence and operational autonomy in AI agents -especially as current AI agents play an increasingly important role in the design of future AI agents. Bearing in mind the far-reaching implications of such possible future scenarios, the urgency of work in ME to ensure the emergence of 'friendly AI' (Yudkowsky 2001 (Yudkowsky , 2008 ) is all the more important to underline.
What is surprising about much of the singularity literature is the way in which its writers seem to be totally enraptured by the technological scenarios, at the expense of paying any attention to the implications of this techno-acceleration for the non-technological parts of the world -for how the living world can supply any viable habitat for all this. (This is not to mention the lack of concern shown by apostles of the singularity for those of the human global population who are on the nether sides of the ever-sharpening digital divide and prosperity divide that seem to be likely to accompany this techno-acceleration.) A thought spared for the parts of the planet that still are, but might soon cease to be, untouched by human thumbprint, seems an impossibility for these writers: they really need to get out more.
On the other hand, many ecological advocates suffer from an opposite incapacity -to see any aspects of technology, particularly those of the Fourth Revolution, as other than a pestilence on the face of the earth. Such writers are as incapable of accommodating the technological as their counterparts are of accommodating anything but the technological. Yet these two parts of 21th century reality -the biosphere and the technosphere -have to be reconciled, and they have to be reconciled by building a picture of Humanity, hand-in-hand with a vision of the More-Than-Human, that really takes our biological-environmental being and our technical genius fully into account . Illustrating moral productivity and moral receptivity as complementary relationships between a moral agent and (the rest of) the moral community. Note that the relationship may, theoretically, hold in one direction for a given kind of agent, without holding in the other direction. For ease of initial understanding the moral agent is pictured as standing outside the moral community, whereas of course, as a moral agent (of one or other kind) it would be part of the moral community. So strictly, the small blob should be inside the larger area. 
